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ABSTRACT 
 
Under what circumstances can a social network user be 
compelled to turn over his or her user identification and 
password in civil litigation? In three recent cases, courts 
attempted to answer this question with varied results. The 
New York Supreme Court Appellate Division refused to 
allow discovery of private Facebook information in 
McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co. because the 
discovery request was not sufficiently tailored to reach 
discoverable information. Soon thereafter, the same court 
allowed discovery of similar material in Romano v. 
Steelcase, Inc. based on the level of publicity of the social 
networking account. In McMillen v. Hummingbird 
Speedway, Inc., the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
allowed discovery of private Facebook information based 
upon similar considerations as the Romano court. The 
McMillen court questioned whether the plaintiff should be 
allowed to block discovery by asserting an evidentiary 
privilege and determined that no reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality exists on social networking sites. The court 
determined that as long as a person’s social network sites 
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contain information relevant to the lawsuit, courts should 
allow litigants to utilize “all rational means for 
ascertaining the truth.” This Article first summarizes the 
potential bases to prohibit discovery of social networking 
information and communication. It then examines the 
recent case law and identifies the level of protection courts 
are willing to afford social networking communication and 
the login information needed to access them in civil 
discovery.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the popularity of social networking sites continues to surge, 
civil litigants increasingly demand disclosure of online 
communications. Opponents of broad social networking discovery 
have asserted several arguments as to why social media 
information should be protected from discovery. First, such 
requests are not relevant under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) 34 and 45 and therefore not discoverable. Second, social 
networking information should be protected by an evidentiary 
privilege—akin to attorney-client privilege or marital privileges—
2
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and inaccessible by opposing counsel. Finally, litigants sometimes 
argue that the Fourth Amendment affords some protection from 
unreasonable intrusions into their privacy. 
In analyzing whether to order disclosure of online 
communications, courts have not only considered the above 
arguments, but have also looked at the social networking sites’ 
terms of service and privacy policies. Those policies are relevant in 
determining whether users have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their online communications. Ultimately, few courts 
find a reasonable expectation of privacy because many sites warn 
that most information is not private.  
This Article first summarizes the varying bodies of law that 
courts have employed in determining when social networking 
information is discoverable. Next, this Article looks at three recent 
decisions that apply one or more of the above rationales and shed 
light on the discoverability of social networking data and the 
credentials—i.e., the usernames and passwords—needed to access 
that data: McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., Romano v. 
Steelcase, Inc., and McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co., all 
decided in 2010.  
 
I. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND SOCIAL NETWORKING 
DISCOVERY 
 
A.  Discoverability and Relevancy 
  
Civil litigants attempt to protect social media communications 
from discovery in many ways, including arguments that the 
information is not relevant. However, under both FRCP 34—
discovery directed at parties to the litigation—and FRCP 
45(A)(1)(c)—discovery directed at non-parties—the bar for 
relevancy in the context of discovery is extremely low.1 Although 
courts frame the judicial tests used to interpret these rules in 
different ways, all of these tests have a presumption in favor of 
discoverability.2  
                                                                                                             
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). 
2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 and infra note 3.  
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The most widely used test only requires that courts consider 
“whether or not evidence might be admissible, or reasonably 
calculated to lead to any evidence that might be found material, or 
relevant in determination of issues involved in proceeding.”3 The 
information sought need not be proven relevant, but only needs to 
“appear relevant.”4 Once this low threshold is met, the party 
resisting discovery has the burden to establish the lack of 
relevance. The resisting party must show that the information 
sought is of “such marginal relevance that the potential harm 
occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary 
presumption in favor of broad disclosure.”5 
 
B.  Discoverability and Evidentiary Privileges 
 
While most courts will find that online social communications 
are relevant, those communications may still be excluded from 
discovery if they are protected by an evidentiary privilege.  
Evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege or 
marital privilege, are a creation of the common law and are not 
explicitly provided for in the Federal Rules of Evidence.6 Under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, common law privileges are to be 
strictly construed.7 Courts may recognize a new category of 
privileges, but to do so the claimant of the privilege bears the 
                                                                                                             
3 Hess v. Pittsburgh Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 49 F.R.D. 271, 272 
(1970) (emphasis added); see also National Utility Service, Inc. v. Northwestern 
Steel & Wire Co., 426 F.2d 222, 225 (1970) (discovery “motion may be verified 
in any reasonable manner demonstrating that the material sought is relevant to 
the issues and that there is some good reason for enlisting the power of the court 
in uncovering the information.”) (emphasis added) (citing Schlagenhauf v. 
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118–19 (1964)); U.S. v. 50.34 Acres of Land, More or 
Less, in Village of East Hills, Nassau County, N.Y., 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (1952) 
(documents are discoverable “where they might give clues as to the existence or 
location of relevant facts, or where they might be useful for purposes of 
impeachment or corroboration.”) (emphasis added). 
4 E.E.O.C. v. Thorman & Wright Corp., 243 F.R.D. 426, 429 (2007). 
5 Id. (emphasis added). A “potential harm” may well be the loss of privacy 
experienced by the litigant forced to turn over private information.  
6 Fed. R. Evid. 501, Advisory Committee Notes.  
7 Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
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burden of proof and must meet a four-step test.8 To establish a 
“social media communication privilege” litigants would be 
required to meet the following test:  
First, the claimant must establish that he or she 
divulged the communication with confidence that 
they would not be disclosed;  
Second, the claimant must show that the element of 
confidentiality is essential to fully and satisfactorily 
maintain the relationship between the parties; 
Third, the claimant must establish that there is 
community agreement that the relationship must be 
sedulously fostered; and 
Fourth, the claimant must show that the injury 
potentially sustained to the relationship because of 
the disclosure outweighs the benefit of correctly 
disposing of the litigation.9  
If the claimant fails to establish the existence of any one of these 
four factors, the court will not recognize a privilege of 
confidentiality and, unless another exception applies, will require 
disclosure of the information sought by the opposing party.  
In the case of a new “social media communication privilege,” 
the litigant seeking the communication’s exclusion would have to 
show that the conversations were presumed confidential, a difficult 
task when the entire premise of social media is to share 
information with a large number of people.  
Even if the party resisting discovery can establish a 
presumption of privacy, that party would further have to show the 
importance of the relationship between the communicating parties 
and that social media relationships are deserving of protection. 
Courts would likely not find that social media communication 
should be “sedulously fostered” to the same degree as 
                                                                                                             
8 See McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc. 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. 
Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (citing Matter of Adoption of Embick, 506 A.2d 455, 
461 (Pa. Super. 1986); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton’s 
rev. ed. 1961). 
9 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton’s rev. ed. 1961). 
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communications within marriage or communications with one’s 
attorney. Moreover, the medium of exchange is unlike private one-
on-one consultation between spouses or attorneys and their clients. 
The privilege was not established to protect public 
communications. And disclosure of confidential information—
even on blogs or in online chats—results in a waiver of the 
privilege itself.10 
In sum, litigants often cannot hide behind the low relevancy 
bar to discoverability and courts will rarely, if ever, create a new 
evidentiary privilege. Most civil litigants will face an uphill battle 
if they try to exclude social networking information under the 
FRCP or the Federal Rules of Evidence. As such, some litigants 
seeking to block such discovery have turned to the right to privacy 
contained in the Fourth Amendment.11 
 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “RIGHT TO PRIVACY” AND 
DISCOVERABILITY 
 
The right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment was first 
proposed by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in an 1890 
Harvard Law Review article.12 The right was characterized as 
essentially the “right to be left alone.” It was not until the Supreme 
Court decided Katz v. United States in 1967 that the right to 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment gained traction.13 In what 
would come to be the predominant constitutional test, Justice 
Harlan in his concurrence proposed a two-part analysis to 
determine whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy has been violated: first, whether the individual had an 
actual expectation of privacy; and second, whether the individual’s 
expectation was “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”14 If either prong fails, the individual has no 
                                                                                                             
10 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2010 WL 4789099 at *1150 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 17, 2010). 
11 See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
12 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890).  
13 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
14 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy, and the government intrusion 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.15 The Fourth Amendment 
only protects against government intrusions that violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
The Katz court further held that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information you have "knowingly 
exposed" to a third-party.16 As such, Supreme Court cases 
following Katz have held that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in phone records, bank records, or trash set out for 
collection.17 
Does the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy extend to 
civil discovery requests? Likely it does not. The Fourth 
Amendment only curtails government action and does not apply to 
private searches.18 And one federal district court proclaimed in 
dicta that “[i]t strains common sense and constitutional analysis to 
conclude that the fourth amendment was meant to protect against 
unreasonable discovery demands made by a private litigant in the 
course of civil litigation.”19 But litigants should not ignore the Katz 
                                                                                                             
15 Id.  
16 See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (“what a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”) (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 
(1966) and United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). 
17 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (“respondents 
exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection,” as they “deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly 
suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, 
for the express purpose of having strangers take it.’”) (quoting United States v. 
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 752–53 (1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in recorded 
conversations by police informant when defendant volunteered information to 
this third-party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”) (citing United States 
v. White, 401 U.S. at 1126; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); 
and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). 
18 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
19 United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 102 
(S.D.N.Y.1979). 
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test altogether in the civil context. Some courts still entertain 
Fourth Amendment challenges to discovery requests, and courts 
often look to the reasonableness of a party’s expectation of privacy 
in social networking communication.20 
 
III. SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES’ TERMS OF SERVICE  
AND PRIVACY POLICIES 
 
Several courts have looked to social networking sites’ terms of 
service as a factor in determining the degree of privacy expected 
by the user. These terms of service and their relevant disclaimers 
illustrate the lack of privacy protections in place for social network 
users who wish to keep their data undiscoverable. 
For example, Facebook’s Data Use Policy reads in pertinent 
part:  
Your information is the information that’s required 
when you sign up for the site, as well as the 
information you choose to share. 
Registration information: When you sign up for 
Facebook, you are required to provide your name, 
email address, birthday, and gender. 
Information you choose to share: Your information 
also includes the information you choose to share 
on Facebook, such as when you post a status 
update, upload a photo, or comment on a friend’s 
story. 
It also includes the information you choose to share 
when you take an action, such as when you add a 
friend, like a Page or a website, add a place to your 
story, find friends using our contact importers, or 
indicate you are in a relationship. 
Your name, profile pictures, cover photos, gender, 
networks, username and User ID are treated just 
like information you choose to make public. . . .  
                                                                                                             
20 See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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We receive information about you from your 
friends and others, such as when they upload your 
contact information, post a photo of you, tag you in 
a photo or status update, or at a location, or add you 
to a group. 
When people use Facebook, they may store and 
share information about you and others that they 
have, such as when they upload and manage their 
invites and contacts. . . .  
[F]or information others share about you, they 
control how it is shared. . . . 
We store data for as long as it is necessary to 
provide products and services to you and others. . . . 
Typically, information associated with your account 
will be kept until your account is deleted. For 
certain categories of data, we may also tell you 
about specific data retention practices.21 
Moreover, Facebook’s Data Use Policy states that in order to 
respond to legal requests and prevent harm, Facebook’s operators 
may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, or 
other civil or criminal requests if they have a good faith belief that 
the law requires them to respond.22  
MySpace has very similar policies that read in pertinent part:  
There may be instances when Myspace may access 
or disclose PII [Personal Identifiable Information], 
Profile Information or non-PII without providing 
you a choice in order to: (i) protect or defend the 
legal rights or property of Myspace, our Affiliated 
Companies or their employees, agents and 
contractors (including enforcement of our 
agreements); (ii) protect the safety and security of 
Users of the Myspace Services or members of the 
                                                                                                             
21 Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
full_data_use_policy (last revised June 8, 2012). 
22 Id. 
9
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public including acting in urgent circumstances; (iii) 
protect against fraud or for risk management 
purposes; or (iv) comply with the law or legal 
process.23 
Litigants attempting to invoke their right to privacy based on a 
reasonable expectation that information stored on either Facebook 
or MySpace is private may face difficulty overcoming the fact that 
according to the plain language of most social networking sites’ 
policies, little to no privacy is guaranteed.  
 
IV. MCMILLEN V. HUMMINGBIRD SPEEDWAY, INC. 
 
In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., a personal injury 
action, plaintiff McMillen filed suit in an attempt to recover 
damages for injuries he sustained when he was rear-ended after a 
stock car race.24 McMillen alleged substantial injuries, including 
possible permanent impairment, loss of general health, and loss of 
enjoyment of life.25 
The defendants sent a discovery request asking if McMillen 
was a member of Facebook or any other social networking sites, 
and if so, requested disclosure of his login information. McMillen 
responded that he was a Facebook member, but that his user name 
and password were confidential and privileged.26 
After reviewing the public portion of McMillen’s Facebook 
account and discovering comments about his fishing trip and 
attendance at another car race in Florida, the defendants filed a 
motion to compel discovery, based on the assertion that such 
information was relevant to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
damages claims.27 Specifically, the defendants wanted to be able 
“to determine whether or not plaintiff has made any other  
 
 
                                                                                                             
23 Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy (last 
updated October 1, 2012). 
24 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010).  
25 Id. at *1.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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comments which impeach and contradict his disability and 
damages claims.”28  
The court granted the defendants’ motion to compel based on 
two judicial considerations. First, it noted that courts “should allow 
litigants to utilize ‘all rational means for ascertaining the truth’” 
where there exists some indication that social networking sites 
contain relevant information.29 And second, it stated that courts 
generally disfavor granting evidentiary privileges.30 
The court recognized that our system of discovery allows for 
broader pre-trial discovery of evidence than may ultimately be 
admissible in trial. Anything relevant to the matter will be 
discoverable at the outset of litigation, regardless of whether it will 
be excluded in trial for other reasons.31 Also, the court noted that 
the law disfavors privileges because of the fundamental belief that 
broad discovery best serves justice.32 Because privileges are a 
“derogation of the search for the truth,” they should be strictly 
construed.33 Based upon these two fundamental premises, the court 
determined that access to social networking sites should be freely 
granted. 
While the court did not explicitly undertake a Fourth 
Amendment privacy analysis, the court further commented on the 
reasonable privacy expectations of a social networking site user 
and determined that it is unrealistic for a user to expect that social 
media communications will be kept confidential. In fact, such 
users are assured only a “modicum of privacy.”34 The privacy 
terms on the social networking sites in question should dispel any 
belief of confidentiality on behalf of the plaintiff.35 The court 
commented that “the complete access afforded to the Facebook 
and MySpace operators alone defeats [Plaintiff’s] proposition that 
                                                                                                             
28 Id. at *2. 
29 Id. at *7 (quoting Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021, 1027 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at *2. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. (quoting Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908–09 (Pa. Super. 
1992)). 
34 Id. at *3. 
35 Id. at *3-4. 
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his communications are confidential.”36 The right of 
confidentiality is lost when an individual knows that a third party 
could overhear or intercept the information.37 
In an assertive conclusion, the court emphasized that allowing 
discovery of social networking sites in anticipation of litigation is 
of very little detriment to society, while the benefits of proving the 
truth or falsity of such claims “cannot be overstated.”38 
 
V. ROMANO V. STEELCASE, INC. 
 
Only a few weeks after McMillen was decided, in Romano v. 
Steelcase, Inc., a New York trial court again allowed defendants to 
access private information on the plaintiff’s Facebook and 
MySpace accounts.39 
In her personal injury action, plaintiff Romano claimed she had 
sustained permanent injuries and was confined to her house 
because of defendant’s negligence.40 In an effort to contest the 
extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, particularly her claims for loss of 
enjoyment of life, the defendant sought discovery of the plaintiff’s 
Facebook and MySpace accounts. The defendant based his request 
on the fact that her public Facebook profile page showed her 
smiling happily outside of her home.41 
In response to the defendant’s requests, Romano argued that 
she held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her 
home computer and her online postings under the Fourth 
Amendment.42 The court rejected Romano’s Fourth Amendment 
claims and found that she in fact had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The court looked to the reasonableness standard set forth 
by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States, and asked whether 
plaintiff had both exhibited an actual subjective expectation of 
                                                                                                             
36 Id. at *5.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at *6.  
39 Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426, 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
40 Id. at 430.  
41 Id. at 427. Under the local court rule, Civil Practice Law and Rule 
(CPLR) 3101, “there shall be full disclosure of all non-privileged matter which 
is material and necessary to the defense or prosecution of an action.”  
42 Id. at 434. 
12
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privacy and whether the expectation is one that society recognizes 
as reasonable.43 The court concluded that an additional factor 
weighing against recognition of a right to privacy on social 
networking sites is the fact that “privacy concerns are far less 
where the beneficiary herself chose to disclose the information.”44 
Lastly, after reviewing the privacy disclaimers on both Facebook 
and MySpace, the court determined that “when plaintiff created her 
accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information 
would be shared with others, notwithstanding her individual 
privacy settings.”45 
Because the public portions of the pages contradicted her 
claims and deposition testimony, the court concluded that there 
was a “reasonable likelihood” the private portions of the sites 
could contain evidence that was “material and relevant to the 
defense” of the action and were therefore discoverable.46 The court 
based much of its decision upon the notion that “plaintiffs who 
place their physical condition in controversy may not shield from 
disclosure material which is necessary to the defense of the 
action.”47 
The court further found that “[t]o deny defendant an 
opportunity to access these sites would not only go against the 
liberal pretrial disclosure and discovery policies of New York, but 
would condone plaintiff's attempt to hide relevant information 
behind self-regulated privacy settings,” a result the court found 
unjust.48 
 
VI. ACCESS GRANTED 
 
Litigants should pay particular attention to the practical effects 
of these decisions. Not only did the McMillen and Romano courts 
find that litigants could discover social media communication, but 
                                                                                                             
43 Id. at 433 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967)).  
44 Id. at 433. (citing Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., No. 
06-5337 (D. N.J., Dec. 14, 2007)).  
45 Id. at 434.  
46 Id. at 430.  
47 Id. at 428 (citing Hoenig v. Westphal, 52 N.Y.2d 605 (1981)). 
48 Id. at 432. 
13
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they both ordered the litigants to turn over the credentials to their 
accounts, thus allowing the requesting party unrestricted access to 
the accounts.49 
Granting such sweeping access represents a break from 
traditional electronic discovery orders. Normally, courts will not 
invoke FRCP 34 to grant unrestricted access to a party’s electronic 
database.50 Rather, the requesting party may inspect and copy the 
information after the producing party turns over the data in a 
“reasonably usable form.”51 The general rule is that courts will 
only allow direct access to a party’s database after the court makes 
a factual finding that the producing party failed to comply with 
discovery rules and after considering the producing party’s 
interests including the “preservation of his records, confidentiality 
of non-discoverable matters and costs.”52  
By allowing access to the credentials of the accounts, the 
courts in McMillen and Romano skipped the production step and 
allowed the requesting party direct access. These cases indicate 
that courts have concluded social media communication deserves 
little privacy protection. In essence, the producing parties had such 
a low interest in protecting the information that the courts did not 
need to find that the party failed to comply with a discovery rule. 
Not all courts grant such broad access.53 But litigants should take 
notice that a court may grant complete access to a party’s social 
networking account. 
                                                                                                             
49 McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Com. 
Pl. 2010); Romano, 30 Misc.3d at 435 (ordering that the plaintiff grant full 
access to the account including the delivery “to counsel for defendant Steelcase 
a properly executed consent and authorization as may be required by the 
operators of Facebook and MySpace, permitting said defendant to gain access to 
plaintiff's Facebook and MySpace records, including any records previously 
deleted or archived by said operators.”). 
50 U & I Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 674 (M.D. 
Fla. 2008) (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
51 Id. (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d at 1316–17). 
52 Id. 
53 Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389, (E.D. Mich. 
2012) (holding that a plaintiff to a civil suit need not turn over login information 
to Facebook account at the defendant’s request, because that request was overly 
broad). 
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VII. COUNTERPOINT—MCCANN V. HARLEYSVILLE  
INSURANCE CO. 
 
Not all courts allow access to social media communication. 
Less than two months after Romano—in a factually similar case—
another New York court came to an opposite conclusion and 
affirmed the lower court’s denial of a motion to compel disclosure 
of a Facebook account.  
In McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co. plaintiff McCann was 
injured in an automobile accident and filed a suit seeking the 
supplementary underinsured motorist coverage from her own 
insurance carrier after claiming the entire insurance policy of the 
other driver involved in the collision.54 During discovery, the 
defendant, McCann’s insurance company, sought access to the 
plaintiff’s Facebook account and photographs posted on the site.55 
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s account was relevant to 
the question of whether she had in fact sustained a serious injury.56 
Aside from this assertion, the defendant could not point to 
anything in particular that her Facebook account would reveal. 
The Supreme Court Appellate Division determined that the 
defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of photographs and 
seeking access to Plaintiff’s account information was properly 
denied by the lower court as overly broad, but could be revisited 
upon the service of a “new, proper discovery demand” at a future 
date.57 The denial was based on the fact that the defendant’s 
request was insufficient because it “failed to establish a factual 
predicate with respect to the relevancy of the evidence.”58 This 
was, in the words of the court, simply a “fishing expedition.”59  
 
                                                                                                             
54 McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 78 A.D.3d 1524, 1524 (2010). 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 1525 (citing Crazytown Furniture v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 
A.D.2d 420, 421 (1989)). 
59 Id. at 1525.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Opponents of social networking discovery requests will likely 
face an uphill battle in their attempt to challenge such requests. 
While the McCann court did deny the discovery requests aimed at 
social networking information, it did so based on the overbroad 
nature of the discovery request, not because social networking 
communications deserve privacy protection. Therefore, while the 
legal grounds for preventing or allowing social networking 
discovery are unclear, courts that have considered social 
networking discovery requests have sent a clear message: social 
networking communications are discoverable. Advocates of broad 
social media discovery have two important factors on their side: 
first, the judicial consensus that courts should permit litigants to 
utilize “all rational means for ascertaining the truth;” and second, 
courts’ established resistance to creating new evidentiary 
privileges.  
Moreover, McMillen and Romano show that litigants can gain 
direct access to a party’s social networking accounts by obtaining 
login and password information via discovery requests. Some 
courts have determined that these accounts are so undeserving of 
protection that they will skip the normal production step and allow 
direct access to the accounts themselves. Attorneys and litigants 
should take notice of this important development. However, 
remember that fishing expeditions—like the one in McCann—are 
never permitted. Social networking data is an easy target, but 
courts still refuse to declare “open season” on irrelevant data. In 
sum, while discovery of social networking information is a 
developing body of jurisprudence, the takeaway for the time being 
is that social networkers should proceed with caution when 
disclosing information on the web.  
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Some courts have granted unrestricted access to social 
networking accounts by requiring disclosure of usernames, 
passwords, and deleted posts stored by the sites. 
 McCann v. Harleysville Insurance Co. may merely address 
overbroad discovery requests and should not be interpreted 
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as a decision on the contours of protecting private personal 
information. The importance of McCann is that litigants 
seeking access to social networking information should 
clearly specify the “factual predicate” upon which they 
seek access to social networking information.  
 Because data use and privacy policies on social networking 
sites are constantly evolving to comply with changing 
regulatory law and public opinion, litigants should be 
careful when relying on the precedential value of previous 
decisions. There very well may have been a wholesale 
upheaval of the social networking sites’ policies since a 
prior decision. For example, since the above cases were 
decided, both Facebook and MySpace have made changes 
to their privacy policies.  
 Blocking social networking communication may not be as 
futile as the above cases make it seem. The best approach 
may be to make a more nuanced argument than those that 
were made in the above cases. While factually and legally 
quite different than the above cases, in Crispin v. Christian 
Audigier, Inc., a copyright infringement and breach of 
contract action, the California District Court used a more 
nuanced approach.60 The court found certain aspects of 
plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace accounts were 
discoverable, while others were not. Messaging systems 
were sufficiently private and exclusive in nature such that 
under the Stored Communications Act, defendants could 
not insist upon their disclosure. Instead, defendants could 
discover only limited aspects of the plaintiff’s social 
networking pages.61 The court determined that the requests 
for Facebook and MySpace data that sought private 
messages should be quashed, but remanded to determine 
the degree of privacy present in Facebook “wall posts” and  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
60 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
61 Id. at 991. 
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MySpace “comments,” as the degree of privacy of these 
functions were less apparent than the private messages.62 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. 
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